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Overview 
 
In this series, paying homage to Paul Shepard’s life and work, I explore 
perhaps his most radically consistent claim and far-reaching exposition, 
an extension of his studies of the totemic mind. In the illusory, futile 
contest between humanity and the natural world (between the pastoral 
and industrialized mind and tribal, totemic MIND), there is a persistent 
image on the face mirror of this struggle, an enemy; humanity faces its 
own animal nature and cannot or refuses to integrate it as part of a 
healthy and complete psyche. Thus the degenerating standoff that Paul 
Shepard describes so eloquently and passionately in many of his books. 
In Thinking Animals: Animals and the Development of Human 
Intelligence,1 Paul Shepard honestly examines human-animal–non-
human-animal relations in ways that shame and inform today’s easy 
and emotional debates on animals rights and relations. His cognitively 
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relevant and empirically supportable argument of why humans should 
mind the animals, is answered, in short: because the human mind is 
animal then and today, and it evolved with (because of) other 
intelligences that supported it. With further estrangement and alienation 
from related-otherness, in Paul Shepard’s words, “Our thoughts will fly 




In answering the question that heads this essay, “What good are 
animals?”, Shepard presented a robust cognitive necessity explanation 
for the aforementioned relations exemplified in the virtues of totemic 
cultures. However, there is a risk that his sophisticated answer and 
arguments could be superficially or easily assimilated as a reiteration of 
anthropological totemism or that their cognitive and evolutionary 
underpinnings could be missed. Or worse, a risk that even when half-
way understood, they could be dismissed as a romantic stance.  
 
After examining the various economical, ecological, and ethical 
arguments for why non-human animals deserve a central place and role 
in our developing cultures, he settles on what he readily admits is a 
“selfish” reason or argument for their preservation: minding animals. 
This is not a selfish, self-interested argument in a biosemiotic sense, if 
we admit that all animals borrow from one another or biosemiotically, 
service each other and that their ensemble survival depends on the 
accurate decoding, further interpretation, and elaboration of 
contextually natural signals. It is a cognitive bridge moving in both 
directions rather than a tap source from where we can drink without 
giving back. 
  
In Shepard’s own words, this argument includes the following 
premises:  
 
1. Human intelligence is bound to the presence of animals.  
2. They [Animals] are the means by which cognition takes its 
first shape and they are the instruments for imagining 
abstract ideas and qualities, therefore giving us 
consciousness.  
3. They [Animals] are the code images by which language 
retrieves ideas from memory at will.  
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4. They [Animals] are the means to self-identity and self-
consciousness as our most human possession, for they 
enable us to objectify qualities and traits. By presenting us 
with related-otherness—that diversity of non-self with 
which we have various things in common—they further, 
throughout our lives, a refining and maturing knowledge of 
personal and human being.3 
 
While re-addressing the above points, I will not try to argue the obvious 
while seeking logical or empirical support from diverse social, 
cognitive, natural, and behavioural scientific disciplines. For example, 
there is ample cross-cultural comparative psychological, archeological, 
artistic, and anthropological evidence that the first two points are 
historically correct.4 As a biosemiotician and cognitive 
ecopsychologist, I am particularly interested in his connection between
our relations to related-otherness and how these relations impact 






5 the third point. In oth
books6 Shepard brilliantly argued that ontogeny, being predicated in 
our relations to related-otherness, leads to a truly mature human nat
This is the essence of point four, which alludes to the mechanism 
(objectification of non-human animal qualities and traits) as the
of self-identification and the emergence of self-consciousness. Th
sentence of point four, and in resonance with Deep Ecology principles,7 
argues that the diversity of non-human animal forms (habits, cognitive 
states, behaviours, and added significations) provides a plethora of 
developmentally useful marks and totemic “masks” that aid human 
maturation processes8 and contribute, ultimately, to a rational definition 
of humanity. 
 
We owe to Shepard the developmental insight that objectification of 
non-human animal qualities and traits that, during Jean Piaget’s stage 
of concrete operations, if not earlier, formed (and can still today) the 
basis for an authentic abstractification of the fully mature and integrated 
self. We owe to Paul Shepard the explanations of how a rational and 
mature evolution of humanity, of authentic being, can follow a totemic 
route that has been (and continues to be) dismissed as childlike 
animism. We owe it to Paul that his arguments can translate easily into 
empirically testable evolutionary cognitive science and biosemiotics.9 
 
This essay will explore, critique, and re-assess his entire minding 
animals argument and, in particular, his last two points. Furthermore, I 
examine the consequences of not minding animals from an 
ecopsychological perspective. All arguments can be distilled to the 
 
 
claim that humans should mind the animals because the human mind is 
animal then and today, and it evolved with (because of) other 
intelligences that supported it. The logical consequence of the 
preceding distillation is Paul Shepard’s prediction that the future of a 
decontextualized mind, a mind that does not mind animals, will: “… fly 
like pollen grains, spinning into the perfect freedom of thin, hot air.”10  
 
When thoughts are not grounded in or do not express these basic 
animal-natural relations, then we only have other over-civilized human 
minds to mind, many of them ill, self-deluded, banal, capricious, or 
artificial. When mass media further propagandizes banal and capricious 
text, this leads, semiotically speaking, to minding corrupted language-
as-thought and finally derailing the psyche into the wrong fixations: 
consumerism, materialism, and the manufactured, disposable culture.  
 
The dysfunctional Machiavellian ape and mind are the products of a 
perverse vacuum: closed cultural systems bred in the insecurities and 
the inadequacies of naturally decontextualized court intrigue. Without a 
pipeline out of the Forbidden City, without a link to LIFE outdoors, the 
necessity for eunuchs and concubines, priests and scribes, plots and 
assassinations, and god-like monarchs is merely replaced by similar 
forms of social decadence, control, and bizarre protocol. 
 
But even within the decadence of contemporary industrialized societies, 
individual non-human animals do emerge to salvage, to save, and to 
heal us. That this animal emergence, without and within, can be so 
thorough in its effects signifies that deep down our animal minds are 
still able to connect to otherness despite its over-civilized patina. 
 
The Case of Seabiscuit, the Horse Millions  
of Americans Identified With 
 
Laura Hillenbrand’s book11 and subsequent movie by the same title, 
Seabiscuit, weaves a complex story of at least three human destinies 
interlinked to the rise to prominence, to the athletic redemption of an 
“underdog horse,” to use a bestial descriptor, Seabiscuit. The 
remarkable, well-written and filmed story does explore the question of 
why millions of Americans in 1938 were so drawn to and finally 
identified with the small and unlikely race horse. However, both book 
and movie take for granted the need of the downtrodden populace, 
exacerbated by the depression era, to identify with an underdog horse as 
a sociological phenomenon. That is, none of the sociological and 
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cultural explanations clarify why the identification was with a non-
human animal, a horse. Even when we admit that this identification was 
also wish fulfillment and that millions of Americans saw in the 
toughness of this unlikely winner the possibility for themselves to come 
up out of the rot, the object of identification and wish fulfillment was 
still a horse. 
 
Paul Shepard argues that the origin of desired qualities and traits are 
intrinsically in the beast.12 Additionally, Seabiscuit’s story suggests 
human characteristics, hopes, and desires projected onto an animal, a 
type of centaur psychology. To the extent that the animal performs as 
desired then the selected components of this projection are satisfied.  
 
Still, why a horse and not a comic book character, or a soldier, or a 
sports hero? Whether projection or assimilation of desired 
characteristics, a trans-species and truly ancient event must have taken 
place at Santa Anita and the other races that Seabiscuit won in the late 
1930s. The distinction between the horse, the rider, and the spectator 
was certainly blurred. In the midst of our civilization, fed by an agrarian 
culture that ploughed with horses and defended or conquered by 
horsemen, it was perhaps easier to relate to the notion that horse and 
rider are one, or must be one, if they are to accomplish these feats. It is 
no secret to the jockey that rider and horse must become a centaur when 
they work together as a seamless creature.  
 
Paul Shepard attributes the centaur with the following, “As one, the 
grafted man and horse combine in the orgiastic passion of the cavalry 
charge, the dream of flight, ravishment, intoxication, destruction.”13 
Perhaps all of these attributes match, with greater or lesser intensity, the 
feelings of an era coming out of intoxication followed by prohibition 
and the desperate need to be freed from poverty and the economic 
situation that bound their possibilities. In such desperate and depressed 
times, the image of a fragile and small jockey riding atop a smaller-
than-usual race horse in “flight” becomes “the orgiastic passion” of 
everyone.  
 
That this particular horse was not a wild animal, and thus not properly 
the subject of what is considered the totemic, is an insufficient reason to 
minimize the effect it had on so many human minds, for there is an 
even more ancient antecedent to the horse-as-transport construct in the 
human mind. Ancient humans painted, symbolized, and fed on horses 
long before they rode them. Recognizing and describing this ancient 
connection between the Pleistocene human mind and horses, Shepard 
wrote:  
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Everything we know about such hunting leads us to suspect that our 
ancestors had “horse” in their stomachs and in their heads in every 
sense: nutritional, metaphysical, esthetic, and metaphorical. Truth of 
the invisible and eternal were to be found in the natural world. And of 
all the animals the horse may well have been the most elusive and 
intelligent, the one deepest in human dreams and imagination, most 
challenging to our imagination, and therefore evoking the most 
eloquent responses. 14 
 
Seabiscuit was “good for many” humans, if albeit momentarily, when it 
counted the most. It would be hard, if not impossible, to quantify the 
positive or long-term effects associated with its identification by the 
masses. However, Seabiscuit is a public and grand example of the 
power of animals to get under our own animal skin and affect equally 
obvious and palpable changes, from collective euphoria to the personal 
symbolic association that if this unlikely winner, a horse, can beat the 
odds, “so can I.” 
 
That a personal and communal identification with Seabiscuit and with 
his story unfolds in the twentieth century, when machines already rule 
the world, is a testament to the primitiveness of this connection and to 
Shepard’s insight.  
 
Equally “under our skin” and deep in our psyches are the symbolic 
linguistic connections that fix the human mind to Animalia and finally 
to MIND at large. The next section sketches the mnemonic uses of 
fauna in reinterpreting aspects of human nature.  
  
Pigs, Bitches, Snakes, and Worms 
The exploration, enjoyment, and inhabitation of natural and wild spaces 
occur in the background of vegetation or bare landscapes where animals 
are mobile, salient forms. This figure-ground relationship wherein 
human animals and non-human animals are animated from within, 
displace ourselves about, and play out our respective species’ dramas, is 
always a whole until we shatter its connections. Although the human 
wanderer of wild spaces is potentially, equally, aesthetically, and 
spiritually impacted by plants, rocks, atmosphere-earth exchanges, 
water, and vistas, animals become the ambassadors, by virtue of their 
closer and mindful relationship, to the totality of the landscape. They 
embody and express MIND in the landscape. Thus, other animals stand 
for the power of signification of MIND, translating an abstract natural 
totality into categories and dichotomies of thought.15  




Paul Shepard is keenly aware of, frequently writes about, and zones in 
on the ease of taxonomical classification inherent in the human child. 
Call them sensitive periods for language acquisition, or devoted 
developmental stages, the link between cognitive development and the 
association of words and then concepts in animal behaviour and 
phenotype, for Paul, stands out as the foundation for later identification 
and full maturity when the child employs the natural lexicon.  
 
It is not surprising that the average frequency of animal metaphors, 
proverbs, surnames, insults, and songs across languages and ethnic 
groups outnumbers botanical or geological references five to one.16 
Even when animal husbandry is itself an ancient labour, it is surprising 
that the focal industry of civilization, agriculture, has not replaced these 
ancient animal figures of speech. Again, the human animal and mind 
finds kinship in other animated forms and finds ways to express this 
kinship. Not only that, but there might be an even more ancient memory 
specific to our species. The animal protein sacrament as Shepard calls 
it, its procurement and consumption, may have enriched and boosted 
the development of our primate brain. The fixation with animal protein, 
its procurement and consumption as a sacred gift, and the 
accompanying and necessary learning of animal habits and traits leads 
naturally to their dichotomizing and as examples of kinship societies.  
 
A central aspect of matching and classifying personality traits while 
observing all behaviour is their stereotyping. Stereotyping is the 
isolation or singularization of a specific trait, habit, or phenotype 
supposing or hoping that this isolated or singular characteristic 
subsumes the whole, the entity. Equally, isolation or singularization of 
trait characteristics is the simplification that could turn the stereotype 
into an insult. Judging by their historical and universal prevalence, 
insults and derogation are necessary cognitive and linguistic constructs 
as useful for self-criticism and self-evaluation as for projective verbal 
attacks.  
 
The animal kingdom behaves aggressively, submissively, sexually 
(bitch-like, stud-like), gluttonously, mysteriously, humorously, 
witchlike, stealthily, passively, nosily, heavenly, lightly, cautiously, or 
prudently. Coyote is humorous, cunning, wise, stupid, arrogant, and 
always a powerful spiritual source. He dances, runs, stalks, appears and 
disappears, surprising himself and baffling human observers. Raven is 
wise, enigmatic, cautious, sombre, noisy, and always a spirit messenger.  
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Reiterating point three of Shepard’s minding animals “because” 
argument, animals remain the code images by which language retrieves 
ideas from memory at will. American idioms reflect this animal 
mnemonic function when we easily use expressions such as jack of all 
trades, social butterfly, bear hug, donkey-Democrats, elephant-
Republicans, busy beaver, he is a sloth, eager beaver, eats like a pig, 
porking out, as the crow flies, beeline, bird’s-eye view, eagle eye, a fly 
on the wall, stubborn as a mule, scarce as hens’ teeth, something smells 
fishy, snake in the grass, speaking with a forked tongue, and many 
others, to explain complex thoughts or denote classification.17 She is a 
foxy lady, he works like a dog, or she looks like a dog, are all phrases 
that play up the ambiguity we feel even toward our faithful canine 
companions. 
 
When the source of the mnemonics is weakened, diluted, or trivialized 
then the aphorisms, metaphors, or idioms are no longer necessary 
cognitive and linguistic constructs for the specific purpose of self-
criticism and self-evaluation, even though they remain trivially useful 
for projective verbal attacks. When the source of these associations is 
finally lost, meaning is also negated.  
 
When the Totem Poles Rot, So Do Our Stories,  
So Do Our Selves 
Atmospheric or astronomical gods are removed and abstract. Yahweh, 
Destiny, Orpheus, and Thor are dangerous, controlling gods not to be 
emulated. Second order gods, virtue or talent gods and goddesses, 
although pointing to a desired ideal human emotion or mental faculty, 
are also removed, inhabiting realms of their own. Usually, the cognitive 
state, gift, or virtue, that they represent, bestow, or encourage are ideals 
not easily attained or are meant to clarify the obscure origins of meme 
knowledge lost to human memory.  
 
For example, as the legend goes, Zeus created the brothers Prometheus 
(foresight) and Epimetheus (hindsight). Prometheus created humans 
and Epimetheus the other animals, the latter giving the rest of the 
animal kingdom the best gifts. As consolation and compensation 
perhaps, and while defying Zeus, Prometheus stole the sacred fire and 
gave it to humanity. Ever since, puny humans have used holocaustic 
warfare on themselves and on the rest of the planet. Atmospheric or 
astronomical pantheistic or monotheistic mythologies alike remove 
humanity from the consequences of its own miscalculated deeds 
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blaming the projected insanity and arrogance of sky-deities for its own 
mischief. 
  
But totemic animal spirits lend themselves to the immediate 
objectification of qualities and traits. Totemism includes personal 
responsibility not only for the animal spirit inherited or married into but 
also for a specific set of tribal responsibilities, rituals, ceremonies, and 
protocols, complementary to those of the other clans. Only when all the 
clans are represented and each carry on their traditional responsibilities 
is the circle of tribal life complete, is tribal life in harmony with natural 
LIFE. 
 
Lacking the daily behavioural reminders of real animals and their 
mythical totemic representations, while forgetting the rituals associated 
with our affiliation, leads to arrogance and an impoverished 
psychology, prevented as it is from animal identification early on and 
continuing throughout our lives. Irrevocably, identification proceeds, as 
Paul Shepard18 clearly traces, as a built-in developmental necessity but 
in a civilized and urban vacuum and, more and more it seems, at the 
mercy of immature adults and banal media. The self, looking for fertile 
and sensible soil to embark upon individuation, only encounters 
simplistic either-or dichotomies and a myriad of persona choices, each 
one more removed from LIFE processes than the next. Although 
abundant, and abundant to the point of confusion,19 the opportunities 
for identification are no natural diversity grounded on real natural 
processes. Like Pinocchio in the land of sweets and diversion, the 
abundance of persona masks and empty behavioural repertoires 
themselves prevent seeing our related-others: Pinocchio remains a 
naïve wooden automaton object rather than a flesh and bones child. 
Worse, the magnificent water and landscapes where our companion 
related-others, all animals, play out their own mythical stories are being 
eroded and robbed, making their own behaviours less natural and more 
desperate.  
 
A measure of this dissociation is the degree to which we infantilize, 
caricaturize, and generally de-humanize even the animals we profess to 
love. Our pampered egos are so full of self-deluding fantasies that they 
project their own tinsel selves onto domesticated animals making them 
appear as ridiculous as we are. These projections, emanating as they do 
from infantilized selves that never truly bonded with nature early on, 
reach bizarre and desperate situations when we then go on to save the 
wild world with off-centre egos. Such was the case of Timothy 
Treadwell, the man-child who lived with grizzly bears and was finally 
mauled and devoured by one of them. It is now known that Mr. 
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Treadwell was mentally unstable when he entered wild spaces and thus 
lacked a realistic understanding of life-and-death processes. Even when 
he entered these wild Alaskan spaces, capable of curing just about any 
urban ill, Mr. Treadwell remained an angry actor-persona subject to 
manic-depressive personality swings that must have been troubling for 
the bears. That he survived thirteen summers in their midst suggests 
that insanity may protect even a foolhardy human from wild grizzlies 
most of the time, but a time comes when a grizzly is hungry enough to 
overlook human eccentricities.  
 
The virtual world of games, being amused by fauna-television and 
never being directly intimidated or taught by it, the preoccupation with 
the mall culture, and the necessity of maintaining entertainment 24/7 
are all blinders to seeing the commonality between ourselves and non-
self. Without the discovery of that commonality of being, the chasm 
between the natural world and us widens. And that is the crux of 
Shepard’s fourth point: the very abundance and diversity of related-
otherness is comprehensible and has permanency, unlike the 
overabundance of material society, but in order to establish a 
psychological commonality of being with the others, with non-self, in 
order to achieve its full adult cognitive effects, the entire taxonomy of 
qualities and traits that could lead to a mature and integrated being 
must be acquired early on.  
 
Totem poles are controversial when carved by pseudo-aboriginal artists. 
Just like Australian aboriginal fake paintings, they adorn without 
informing. Before most of the genuine totem poles rotted away and 
their clan representatives forgot all about their masks, before dreamtime 
was a Western happy song, or before Mayan calendrical motifs were 
incinerated in a Promethean bonfire by insecure priests, the information 
contained in masks, dots, and bars was very similar: a continuum exists 
between the beginning of time and today, between myself and the 
jaguar, between my tribe and the natural world. Lacking these 
fundamentals means not minding history, natural or human, not 
minding the animals, not minding the entire natural world. 
 
Conclusion  
It takes a writer of Shepard’s calibre, in conviction and knowledge, to 
make a reader feel instantly depressed and optimistic at the same time. 
At the same moment, the reader realizes the ecopsychological drift, the 
loss of kinship with wild animals and of a material savage world, 
Shepard aptly formulates and draws the blueprint for redemption, 
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regeneration, and hope. The blueprint presented in the form of an 
argument that explains why humans should mind other animals is, as I 
named it early on, a cognitive necessity argument. This qualification 
needs to be reiterated for I believe it is central to Shepard’s thinking and 
argument. A professor of Human Ecology and a sophisticated student of 
human development, he zones in on cognitive development as key to 
understanding nature estrangement or alienation.  
 
By emphasizing that cognitive development is qualitatively different 
when sufficiently naturally enriched, when cognitive development is 
fed by an increasingly large taxonomy of animals and animal parts, he 
brings psychology to a new focus, perhaps even dragging the entire 
field to a necessary paradigm. Notwithstanding empirical studies and 
field observations reporting that natural peoples exhibit formidable 
classificatory, mnemonic, and taxonomical capacities surpassing those 
of the urban child and adult, Shepard’s argument and insight fleshes out 
these more cognitive aspects of human development, while at the same 
time saying something more profound about their effects on a mature 
psychology. While doing this, his psychology is not only normative but 
becomes ecopsychology. His final message, one reiterated by others, is 
that without an ecopsychology we won’t survive. Worse, in our own 
self-enacted demise we are ripping apart larger and larger chunks of the 
natural world in acts of holocaustic, irreparable destruction. 
 
And yet there is room for redemption if we intellectually accept, take to 
heart, and enact his “selfish” argument. That human intelligence is 
bound to the presence of animals includes our humane responsibilities 
to animals in bondage and respect for those in wild freedom. That 
animals are the means by which cognition takes its first shape and that 
they are the instruments for imagining abstract ideas and qualities, 
therefore giving us consciousness is corroborated by even a cursory 
look at the frequency of animal images, characters, and themes in 
children’s books and movies, youth’s entertainment, and adult fantasies.  
 
The degree to which the last two groups are not transferring these 
earlier real or imagined lesson-faunas into healthy reinterpretations and 
models for self construction could determine immature human-human, 
human-nature affiliations, terminating in anthropocentric and clinical 
psychology, never reaching a grounded ecopsychology. Our mental 
lexicons, in slips-of-the-tongue, metaphors, dreams, or in our insults, 
are proof enough that animals are the code images by which language 
retrieves ideas from memory at will. More importantly, these 
biosemiotic connections have the power to affect personality 
development, beneficially, when they are employed for the specific 
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therapeutic purpose of self-criticism and self-evaluation. If I have been 
eating like a pig for too long, perhaps it is time I begin eating like a 
bird. “Eating too much,” “eating excessively” or “eating too little” or 
“eating less” do not quite convey my situation so bluntly.  
 
Finally, because of all of the above points, animals become the means 
to self-identity and give us self-consciousness as our most human 
possession, for they enable us to objectify qualities and traits. 
Replacing animals with other humans—limited, prescribed, 
idiosyncratic, and uniform as they exist in the urban landscape—means 
to perpetuate infantile fixations or to reduce the diversity of MIND and 
behaviours. Uniquely human positive role models exist for children and 
adults to emulate. But even these are being replaced by the new 
archetypes of rape, horror, mutilation, and crude wealth. To mitigate 
and correct the human monoculture of “success,” “abundance,” 
“divertimentos,” and never-ending mass-sized, superficial human 
connections, animals present us with the related-otherness—that 
diversity of non-self with which we have various things in common.  
 
Their diversity of forms, minds, habits, colours, and habitats all 
converge on the same existential theme whose denial makes life and 
death processes meaningless and morbid at the same time. Whereas 
anthropocentric, affluential, and entertainment themes explode away in 
multiple and contradictory messages or fizzle out into nonsense, the 
convergence of natural diversity seldom confuses when its ecological 
fundamentals are understood. It is its self-correcting capacity for being 
understood that makes it a trusted encyclopedia. It is its self-correcting 
capacity for being understood that makes it developmentally and 
cognitively important. Paul Shepard understood and communicated this 
insight more profoundly than most writers and scholars. 
 
By our lifelong proximity to them, animals further a refining and 
maturing knowledge of personal and human being. If human 
development is lifelong, it profits from the re-interpretative possibility 
of previous animal associations at subsequent stages of identification 
and individuation. Raven in my fifties means other strategies of my own 
mind and personality, more subtle perhaps than cunning raven at thirty. 
Raven, as a related-other mirror for middle age, might mean patience, 
fortitude, and conservation of energy for when the right opportunity 
comes around. Raven teaches me that scavenging is an art. Proximity 
does not mean keeping animals in cages and zoos for amusement or 
distraction. Animals in cages and zoos are seldom qualified 
ambassadors of their wild brethren. Zoo animals, like over-civilized 
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humans, are limited, prescribed, idiosyncratic and do not exemplify true 
diversity of MIND and behaviours.  
 
Minding animals is, as Paul Shepard suggests, a fundamental reason to 
include them in our lives on their own intrinsic terms. Not minding 
animals admits to anthropocentrism and to the strange and fetish desire 
of “going at it alone.” If the rise of human intelligence and self-
consciousness was indeed predicated and founded on our understanding 
of other animal minds, what happens when the book of Animalia is 
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